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Abstract
The process of evolutionary diversification unfolds in a vast genotypic space of potential
outcomes. During the past century there have been remarkable advances in the develop-
ment of theory for this diversification (Fisher, 1930; Wright, 1984; Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1988; Lynch and Walsh, 1998; Bu¨rger, 2000; Ewens, 2004; Barton et al., 2007), and the the-
ory’s success rests, in part, on the scope of its applicability. A great deal of this the-
ory focuses on a relatively small subset of the space of potential genotypes, chosen largely
based on historical or contemporary patterns, and then predicts the evolutionary dynam-
ics within this pre-defined set. To what extent can such an approach be pushed to a
broader perspective that accounts for the potential open-endedness of evolutionary diversifi-
cation? There have been a number of significant theoretical developments along these lines
(Gillespie, 1984; Fontana and Buss, 1994; Szathmary, 1995; Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry,
1995; Wagner and Altenberg, 1996; Orr, 1998; Stadler et al., 2001; Yedid and Bell, 2002;
Orr, 2002; Wagner and Stadler, 2003; Fernando and Rowe, 2007; Nowak and Ohtsuki, 2008;
Joyce et al., 2008; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2009; Manapat et al., 2009) but the question of how
far such theory can be pushed has not been addressed. Here a theorem is proven demonstrat-
ing that, because of the digital nature of inheritance, there are inherent limits on the kinds
of questions that can be answered using such an approach. In particular, even in extremely
simple evolutionary systems a complete theory accounting for the potential open-endedness
of evolution is unattainable unless evolution is progressive. The theorem is closely related
to Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem (Go¨del, 1931; Nagel and Newman, 1958; Davis, 1965;
van Heijenoort ed., 1967) and to the Halting Problem from computability theory (Turing,
1936; Cutland, 1980).
Introduction1
Much of evolutionary theory is, in an important sense, fundamentally historical. The2
process of evolutionary diversification unfolds in a vast genotypic space of potential3
outcomes, and explores some parts of this space and not others. Nevertheless, a great deal4
of current theory restricts attention to a relatively small subset of this space, chosen largely5
based on historical or contemporary patterns, and then predicts evolutionary dynamics.6
Although this can work well for making short-term predictions, ultimately it must fail once7
evolution gives rise to genuinely novel genotypes lying outside this predefined set8
(Yedid and Bell, 2002).9
This potential limitation on the predictive ability of many models of evolution has been10
noted on various occasions throughout the development of evolutionary theory (Levinton,11
1988; Fontana and Buss, 1994; Wagner and Altenberg, 1996; Yedid and Bell, 2002),12
perhaps most famously by Dutch biologist Hugo DeVries when he remarked that “Natural13
selection may explain the survival of the fittest, but it cannot explain the arrival of the14
fittest” (DeVries, 1904). Such statements hint at the notion that many models of evolution15
are what we might call ‘local’, or ‘closed’, in the sense that they focus attention on a very16
small (local) region of the evolutionary tree and do not account for the possibility that17
evolution is an open-ended process.18
The distinction between ‘closed’ and ‘open-ended’ models of evolution will be discussed in19
more detail below, but in recent years there have been several interesting studies published20
that are beginning to push the boundaries of analyses towards what we might naturally21
call open-ended models. These studies include models of abstract replicator populations22
(Fontana and Buss, 1994; Szathmary, 1995; Nowak and Ohtsuki, 2008;23
Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2009; Manapat et al., 2009), models exploring the space of24
evolutionary possibilities (Fontana and Schuster, 1998b; Stadler et al., 2001;25
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Wagner and Stadler, 2003), analyses of evolutionary transitions26
(Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry, 1995; Fontana and Schuster, 1998a), models for27
predicting the distribution of allelic effects during evolution (Gillespie, 1984; Orr, 1998,28
2002; Joyce et al., 2008), and studies of evolvability (Wagner and Altenberg, 1996).29
Similarly, there have also been many in silico and artificial life experiments that explore30
generic, emergent, properties of evolution (Fontana and Buss, 1994; Lenski et al., 1999;31
Yedid and Bell, 2001; Wilke et al., 2001; Yedid and Bell, 2002; Lenski et al., 2003;32
Chow et al., 2004; Ostrowski et al., 2007; Fernando and Rowe, 2007; Yedid et al., 2008,33
2009). In general these analyses have demonstrated that, once we allow for more34
open-ended evolution, a much richer suite of evolutionary possibilities arises.35
The above studies collectively suggest that accounting for open-ended evolution in theory36
can yield interesting new insights, and it can also yield new testable predictions (Gillespie,37
1984; Orr, 1998, 2002; Joyce et al., 2008). Nevertheless, there is still a relative paucity of38
theoretical studies that allow for open-ended evolution, and so we might expect that much39
is yet to be learned by broadening evolutionary theory further in this way. My purpose40
with this article is therefore twofold. First, I simply wish to highlight the fact that there is41
an important distinction to be made between open-ended versus closed models of evolution42
(defined more precisely below), and to suggest that open-ended models might more43
faithfully represent the evolutionary process. Second, and more significantly, I wish to44
consider whether a push towards a predictive theory that embraces the potential45
open-endedness of evolution is likely to face additional obstacles, over and above those46
faced by closed models of evolution. Put another way, I ask the question: To what extent is47
the development of a predictive, open-ended evolutionary theory possible?48
Although a complete answer to the above question is not possible, in what follows I will49
provide at least a partial answer. Furthermore, I demonstrate that this answer has50
interesting connections to the Halting Problem from computability theory and to Go¨del’s51
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Incompleteness Theorem from mathematical logic. In particular, I will use results from52
these areas to prove a theorem that formally links the concept of progressive evolution to53
the possibility of developing such a predictive open-ended theory. There remains debate54
over if, and when, evolution might be progressive (Dawkins, 1997; Gould, 1997;55
Adami et al., 2000) and part of this debate stems from the lack of a precise yet general56
definition of progression. Thus, another way to view the results presented here is as57
providing such a definition. I will return to this point more fully in the discussion.58
A Motivating Example59
To sharpen the focus on these somewhat abstract ideas, it is worth beginning with a60
concrete motivating example involving evolutionary prediction. This section does so,61
focussing primarily on the broad conceptual issues involved. The section that follows then62
addresses these issues more precisely.63
Consider trying to use evolutionary theory to predict the dynamics of human influenza.64
Specifically, consider trying to answer the following question: is it likely that a pandemic65
with the 1918 Spanish influenza strain will ever occur again? This is obviously a difficult,66
and still somewhat loosely defined, question so let’s narrow things down further. One67
reason we might be skeptical about our ability to make such predictions is because of68
uncertainty in initial conditions and parameter values, as well as uncertainty about the69
evolutionary processes involved. In other words, perhaps we lack all of the information70
required to make such predictions. Furthermore, unexpected contingencies might thwart71
what would otherwise be accurate predictions. For example, an unanticipated volcanic72
eruption might temporarily alter commercial air travel patterns, and this might thereby73
alter the epidemiological and evolutionary dynamics of influenza.74
These practical limitations are clearly important, but are they the only obstacle to making75
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accurate evolutionary predictions or are there other, ‘inherent’, limitations as well. Does76
the difficulty of making evolutionary predictions stem simply from our lack of knowledge of77
the evolutionary processes involved or are there reasons why, even in principle, such78
evolutionary predictions are not possible?79
It is this latter question that is the focus of this article, and therefore I will, at least80
temporarily, put the above practical concerns aside. Specifically, let’s assume that we can81
build a model that adequately captures all of the relevant evolutionary processes, and that82
we can obtain all parameter estimates necessary to use such a model. Without getting too83
much into the specifics, one of the first things we would need to decide is the relevant strain84
space for the model. The simplest scenario would consider only two strains (e.g., the 191885
strain and the current, predominant, strain). More sophisticated scenarios might instead86
include several strains that are thought to be important in the dynamics. In either case,87
both such resulting models would be ‘closed’ in the sense described in the introduction88
because they focus only on a finite (and relatively small) number of strains. Furthermore,89
given that there is a discrete and finite number of people who can be infected at any given90
time, there is then also a finite (and relatively small) number of possible evolutionary91
outcomes. As will be detailed more precisely later, this then implies that the process will92
either reach a steady state or it will display periodic behaviour (see Appendix 5). Hence, if93
a closed model is an accurate description of the evolutionary process, then in principle we94
can answer the above question by simply running the model until one of these two outcomes95
occurs. At that point we need only observe whether or not a 1918 Spanish flu pandemic96
ever occurred during the run of the model (or if it occurred with significant probability).97
But what if the evolutionary process is, instead, open-ended? To explore this possibility we98
need to be more specific about what is meant by open-ended. Consider again the influenza99
example. Influenza A has a genome size of more that 12,000 nucleotides, and therefore the100
number of possible genotypes is enormous. To gain some perspective on just how many101
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genotypes are possible, let’s restrict attention to only the smallest of the eight genomic102
segments of influenza. In this case there are then only approximately 800 nucleotides and103
therefore approximately 4800 different possible genotypes. To put this number in104
perspective, it is approximately 10400 times larger than the estimated number of atoms in105
the universe. For a model to be open-ended it would have to allow for such a vast set of106
possible evolutionary outcomes so that, as in reality, evolutionary change could continue107
unabated, producing potentially novel outcomes essentially indefinitely. The simplest way108
we might try to capture this theroetically is to assume that the space of possible genotypes109
is infinite.110
Given these considerations, if evolutionary theory is to capture an open-ended evolutionary111
process, then its state space must be effectively infinite. This is necessary but it is not a112
sufficient condition for open-ended evolution. For example, many stochastic Markovian113
models in population genetics have an infinite state space (e.g., the infinite alleles model;114
Kimura and Crow (1964)) but nevertheless do not display open-ended evolution. Rather,115
further assumptions are often made, such as the assumption that the Markov chain is116
irreducible and positively recurrent. These assumptions are usually made primarily for117
mathematical convenience but they rule out the possibility of open-ended evolution since118
they then guarantee the existence a single unique equilibrium or stationary distribution.119
As a result, such models cannot capture the possibility that evolutionary change might120
continue indefinitely.121
What if we relax these assumptions and allow for truly open-ended evolution in the theory122
that we develop? Are there then even further problems associated with making123
evolutionary predictions? For example, does this make answering the question about124
influenza evolution laid out at the start of this section more difficult? You might suspect125
that the answer is ‘yes’; at least, the approach suggested above for closed models will no126
longer suffice because the evolutionary process is no longer guaranteed to settle down to an127
equilibrium or stationary distribution. Thus, the best we can possibly hope for is that there128
is some way to prove, using the structure of the model, whether or not such an outcome will129
occur. Thus, all practical difficulties of predicting evolution aside, it is not obvious whether130
we can answer the above sort of question about influenza evolution, even in principle.131
These issues are now starting to tread heavily into the fields of computability and132
mathematical logic and, roughly speaking, a theory that can answer the above kind of133
question about influenza evolution is referred to as a negation-complete theory. This134
terminology reflects the idea that the theory is complete in the sense of one being able to135
determine whether a given statement is true, or whether its formal negation is true instead.136
For example, in the context of influenza, a negation-complete theory would be able to137
predict whether the statement ‘the Spanish flu will happen again’ is true or whether its138
formal negation ‘it is not true that the Spanish flu will happen again’ is true instead. More139
generally, a negation-complete evolutionary theory would be one from which we could140
determine those parts of genotypic space will be explored by evolution and those that will141
not.142
Is such a negation-complete theory possible once we allow for open-ended evolution? In the143
remainder of this article I show that the answer to this question is closely related to the144
idea of progressive evolution. In particular, even if the system of evolution were simple145
enough for us to understand everything about how its genetic composition changes from146
one generation to the next, the following theorem is proven:147
Theorem: A negation-complete evolutionary theory is possible if, and only if, the148
evolutionary process is progressive.149
The above theorem will be made more precise shortly, but as already alluded to above, it150
stems from the fact that DNA affords evolution a mechanism of digital inheritance. As151
Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry have noted (Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry, 1995) the152
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combinatorial complexity that arises thereby allows evolution to be effectively open-ended.153
Indeed, as will be argued below, digital inheritance allows one to characterize evolution154
(i.e., the change in genetic composition of a population) as a dynamical system on the155
natural numbers, and therefore the theorem proved below holds for any such dynamical156
system, not just those meant to model evolution. As a result, the theorem is closely related157
to other results from mathematics and computer science; namely Go¨del’s Incompleteness158
Theorem (Go¨del, 1931; Nagel and Newman, 1958; Davis, 1965; van Heijenoort ed., 1967)159
and to the Halting Problem from computability theory (Turing, 1936; Cutland, 1980).160
Statement and Proof of Theorem161
In order to give precision to the above theorem, we must specify what is meant by ‘the162
evolutionary process’, as well as what it means for evolutionary theory to be163
negation-complete. The goal is to determine if, even in extremely simple evolutionary164
processes, there is some inherent limitation on evolutionary theory.165
To this end, consider a simplified evolutionary process in which there is a well-mixed166
population of replicators with some maximal population size, and in which each replicator167
contains a single piece of DNA. This genetic code can mutate in both composition, and in168
length, with no pre-imposed bounds. Suppose that each replicator survives and reproduces169
in a way that depends only on the current genetic composition of the population. For170
additional simplicity, suppose that generations are discrete. All conclusions hold if events171
occur in continuous time instead (Appendix 5). Finally, for simplicity of exposition, I will172
usually assume that the evolutionary dynamics are deterministic in the main text. Again,173
all results generalize to the case of stochastic evolutionary dynamics, albeit with a few174
additional assumptions (Appendix 5).175
With the above evolutionary dynamic, the genetic composition of the system will evolve176
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over time, and we can characterize the state of the system at any time by the number of177
each type of replicator (e.g., the number of infections with each possible genotype of178
influenza). The goal then is to determine if it is possible to construct an evolutionary179
theory that can predict which parts of the space of potential evolutionary outcomes will be180
explored during evolutionary diversification, and which will not. Formally, the results181
presented below are valid for any theory whose derived statements are recursively182
enumerable. Axiomatic theories are one such example but (roughly speaking) any183
theoretical approach that can, in principle, be implemented by a computer falls into this184
category (Appendix 1). Indeed, the statement and proof of the theorem relies on several185
ideas from computability theory (Appendix 2).186
The digital nature of inheritance provided by DNA means that, in principle, the number of187
distinct kinds of replicators that are possible is discrete and unbounded, a property188
Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry refer to as ‘indefinite’ heredity189
(Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry, 1995). It is indefinite heredity that allows for open-ended190
evolution. As a result, in principle, the set of possible population states during evolution is191
isomorphic to the positive integers; i.e., there exists a one-to-one correspondence between192
the set of possible population states and the positive integers. Such sets are called193
denumerable, and in fact the set of population states is effectively denumerable in a194
computability sense (Appendix 3). Thus we can effectively assign a unique integer-valued195
‘code’ to every possible population state.196
In practice, of course, there are limits on the number of kinds of replicators possible, if only197
because of a finite pool of the required chemical building blocks. Nevertheless, as198
mentioned earlier the combinatorial nature of indefinite heredity means that the actual199
number of possible population states is so large as to be effectively infinite. For simplicity200
of exposition, it is assumed in the main text that the set of possible population states is201
truly infinite; however, Appendix 6 makes the notion of ‘effectively infinite’ precise and202
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provides the analogous results for this case.203
With the above coding we can formalize evolution mathematically as a mapping of the204
positive integers to themselves. For example, in the deterministic case we might start with205
a model (e.g., a mapping F ) that tells us the number of individuals of each genotype in the206
next time step, as a function of the current numbers. Then, under the above coding, if207
E(n) denotes the population state (formally, its integer code number) at time n, the model208
can be recast as a single-variable, integer, mapping E(n+ 1) = G(E(n)) for some function209
G, along with some initial condition. Similarly, in the stochastic case, if we start with a210
probabilistic mapping F , then it can be recast as a mapping E(n+ 1) = H(E(n)) where H211
gives the probability distribution over the set of code numbers in the next time step as a212
function of its current distribution (and E is then a vector of probabilities over the213
integers). Therefore, in general, we can view the evolutionary trajectory as being simply an214
integer-valued function with an integer-valued argument. Of course, different ways of215
coding the population states will correspond to different maps, G or H , and thus different216
functions E(n). Also note that the domain of G or H need not be all of the positive217
integers, and in fact different initial conditions might give rise to different domains as well.218
This would correspond to there being different basins of attraction in the evolutionary219
process.220
It is also worth noting that, although we have assumed the evolutionary mapping (i.e., G or221
H) is a function of the current genetic composition of the population only, we can relax this222
assumption and allow evolutionary change to depend on other aspects of the environment223
as well. In particular, we might expand our definition of ‘population state’ to include both224
genetic state, and the state of other variables associated with the environment in which the225
genes exist. Again, as long as such generalized processes can be recast as dynamical226
systems on the natural numbers, all of the results presented here continue to hold.227
The above arguments illustrate how we can view evolution as a dynamical system on the228
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natural numbers, and they also now allow us to formalize the notion of open-ended229
evolution. In the deterministic setting evolution is open-ended if the mapping G never230
revisits a previously visited state. Likewise, in the stochastic setting, evolution is231
open-ended if the mapping H always admits at least one new state each generation with232
positive probability.233
Because we can view evolution as a dynamical system on the natural numbers,234
evolutionary theory can be viewed as a set of specific rules for manipulating and deducing235
statements about such numbers. Computability theory deals with functions that map236
positive integers to themselves, and thus provides a natural set of tools to analyze the237
problem. A function is called ‘computable’ if there exists some algorithmic procedure that238
can be followed to evaluate the function in a finite number of steps (Appendix 2).239
Again, focusing on the deterministic case, given the assumption that we are able to predict240
the state of the population from one time step to the next, the function E(n) is241
computable (see Appendix 2). Furthermore, the set of all computable functions is242
denumerable (Cutland, 1980). Therefore, denoting the kth such function by φk(n), it is243
clear the evolutionary process, E(n), must correspond to a member of this set. Denote this244
specific member by φE(n), and again note that, if we change the integer-coding used to245
identify specific population states, we will obtain a different function Eˆ(n), and thus a246
different member of the set, φEˆ(n) (Fig. 1).247
During evolution, a set of population states will be visited over time (in the stochastic case248
we consider a state as being visited if the probability of it occurring at some point is larger249
than a threshold value; Appendix 5). These will be referred to as ‘evolutionarily attainable’250
states. In terms of our formalism, this corresponds to the function φE(n) taking on various251
values of its range, RE , as n increases (Fig. 1). A negation-complete evolutionary theory252
would be one that can determine whether a code, x, satisfies x ∈ RE or whether it satisfies253
x /∈ RE instead. In the language of computability theory, this corresponds to asking254
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whether the predicate ‘x ∈ RE ’ is decidable (Appendix 2; (Cutland, 1980)). In terms of the255
influenza example presented earlier, if x is the population state corresponding to a256
pandemic with the 1918 strain, then the statement ‘the Spanish flu will happen again’257
corresponds to the number-theoretic statement x ∈ RE . Likewise, the statement ‘it is not258
true that the Spanish flu will happen again’ corresponds to the number-theoretic statement259
x /∈ RE .260
Lastly, we can give a precise definition of progressive evolution. Intuitively, evolution is261
progressive if there is some quantifiable characteristic of the population that increases262
through evolutionary time. In terms of the above formalization, this means there is a way263
to recode the population states such that the code number increases during evolution.264
Formally, evolution is progressive if there exists a computable, one-to-one, coding of the265
population states by positive integers, Cˆ, such that the corresponding description of the266
evolutionary process, φEˆ(n), satisfies φEˆ(n + 1) > φEˆ(n) for all n. Again, in terms of the267
influenza example presented earlier, if evolution were progressive, then there would be some268
way to a priori code the population states such that, as influenza evolution occurs, the269
code number of the population increases (I will return to this definition of progression in270
more detail in the discussion).271
We can now rephrase the theorem in terms of precise, technical, language:272
Theorem: ‘x ∈ RE’ is decidable if, and only if, there exists a computable, one-to-one,273
coding of the population states by positive integers, Cˆ, such that the corresponding274
description of the evolutionary process, φEˆ(n), satisfies φEˆ(n+ 1) > φEˆ(n) for all n.275
Proof (Figure 1; see Appendices 2 and 4 for additional details):276
Part 1: If there exists a coding Cˆ such that φEˆ(n+ 1) > φEˆ(n) for all n then the predicate277
‘x ∈ RE ’ is decidable.278
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By hypothesis there exists a computable bijection Cˆ such that, for the corresponding279
description of the evolutionary process, φEˆ(n + 1) > φEˆ(n) for all n. For any population280
state, x, in the original coding, let xˆ be the corresponding code under the bijection Cˆ, and281
define z(xˆ) = µi(φEˆ(i) ≥ xˆ), where µi(H(i)) denotes the minimum value of i for which the282
argument H(i) is true (Appendix 2). Further, define Rk(n) = {x : φk(i) = x, i ≤ n} (i.e.,283
the range of φk(n) visited by step n; Appendix 2). Clearly ‘xˆ ∈ REˆ(z(xˆ))’ is decidable since284
REˆ(z(xˆ)) is finite and can be enumerated, and furthermore xˆ ∈ REˆ(z(xˆ))⇔ xˆ ∈ REˆ owing285
to the progressive nature of evolution. Therefore, ‘xˆ ∈ REˆ’ is decidable as well. Finally,286
using S denote the set of population states that are evolutionarily attainable, we have that287
xˆ ∈ REˆ ⇔ Cˆ
−1xˆ ∈ S ⇔ CCˆ−1xˆ ∈ RE . Noting that, by definition, x = CCˆ
−1xˆ, we obtain288
xˆ ∈ REˆ ⇔ x ∈ RE . Thus, ‘x ∈ RE ’ is decidable as well.289
Part 2: If the predicate ‘x ∈ RE’ is decidable then there exists a coding Cˆ such that290
φEˆ(n + 1) > φEˆ(n) for all n.291
We can construct the required computable bijection between population states and an292
appropriate coding as follows. First, take any effective coding of population states. By293
hypothesis ‘x ∈ RE ’ is decidable and therefore we can proceed through the population294
states, x, in increasing order, applying the following algorithm:295
(i) if x /∈ RE and it is the k
th such state up to that point, use the kth odd number as its296
new code.297
(ii) if x ∈ RE , calculate µi(φE(i) = x), and use the i
th even number as its new code.298
Thus, REˆ is the set of even numbers, and they are visited in increasing order as evolution299
proceeds. In particular, using CˆC−1 to denote the above mapping described in points (i)300
and (ii), where C−1 is the inverse mapping of the coding that generated x (i.e., it takes301
code x and returns the corresponding population state, s), we have302
φEˆ(n + 1) = CˆC
−1φE(n+ 1) = 2(n+ 1). The last equality follows from the fact that303
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CˆC−1φE(n+ 1) determines the time at which state φE(n+ 1) occurs (which is n+ 1), and304
assigns it a new code equal to twice this value (point (ii) above). Therefore305
φEˆ(n + 1) > φEˆ(n) ∀n.306
Q.E.D.307
Discussion308
This article has two main goals. The first goal is to highlight the distinction between309
open-ended versus closed models of evolution, and to suggest that open-ended models310
might better capture real evolutionary processes. The second goal is to explore the extent311
to which the development of a predictive, open-ended theory of evolution is possible. The312
above theorem illustrates that there is an interesting connection between this question and313
analyses from computability theory and mathematical logic. It also draws a formal314
connection between the extent to which such a theory is possible and the notion of315
progressive evolution.316
Because the theorem states an equivalence relationship between the possibility of317
developing a negation-complete theory and progressive evolution, it can be read in two318
distinct ways. First, it states that if evolution is progressive then a negation-complete319
theory is possible. This is, perhaps, not too surprising. If evolution is progressive then320
there would be a good deal of regularity to the process that one ought to be able to exploit321
in constructing theory. The second way to read the theorem is from the perspective of the322
reverse implication. This is somewhat more surprising; it states that if evolution is not323
progressive then a negation-complete theory will not be possible.324
These results rest on the fact that digital inheritance allows evolution to be open-ended325
(Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry, 1995). If, instead, the hereditary system allowed for only326
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a finite number of discrete possible types, then evolution would either display periodic327
behaviour or would reach an equilibrium (possibly with stochastic fluctuations; Appendix328
5). A negation-complete theory of evolution would then be trivially possible in such cases329
because, in principle, we could simply develop a finite list of all evolutionary outcomes that330
can occur (as described in the influenza example earlier).331
Of course, despite the existence of digital inheritance, there is nevertheless presumably a332
bound on the number of population states possible for a variety of reasons. Even so,333
however, the combinatorial nature of digital inheritance means that the number of possible334
population states might be considered effectively infinite. An analogous theorem can be335
proven in such cases by replacing the notion of infinite with a precise notion of effectively336
infinite instead (Appendix 6). Likewise, although the main results of the text assume that337
evolution is deterministic, an analogous theorem holds that accounts for the inherently338
stochastic nature of the evolutionary process (Appendix 5).339
The notion of progressive evolution is somewhat slippery, and there does not exist a340
general yet precise definition of progression that is universally agreed upon. As a result,341
this has led to disagreement over the extent to which progressive evolution occurs342
(Dawkins, 1997; Gould, 1997). A complete discussion of the idea of progressive evolution is343
beyond the scope of this article but a few points are worth making here.344
Most discussions of progressive evolution involve quantities like mean fitness, body size,345
complexity, or other relatively conspicuous biological measurements. Many such discussions346
also are retrospective in the sense that they look at historical patterns when attempting to347
find patterns of progression. But both of these aspects of discussions of progression are348
problematic. First, although it would be nice to readily identify some obvious, and349
biologically meaningful, characteristic of a population that changes in a directional way,350
there is no reason to expect that we have currently thought of all the possibilities. Thus,351
when defining progression, it would seem desirable to do so in a very general way, leaving352
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open the possibility that some biologically interesting, but as yet undiscovered quantity353
increases over time. Second, looking toward historical patterns for definitions of354
progression is essentially looking at data and then designing an hypothesis to fit.355
Progression ought to be defined prospectively rather than retrospectively, meaning that it356
ought to have predictive value; if evolution is progressive, then we ought to be able to357
define, a priori, a quantity that will increase.358
The definition of progression used here was purposefully chosen to deal with the359
above-mentioned difficulties. Thus, as it stands, it necessarily is not linked to any specific360
biological measurement. By the definition used here, the quantity that might increase over361
time need not have any obvious biological interpretation outside of the role that it plays in362
progressive evolution. This level of generality seems desirable if we are asking questions363
about the existence of such a quantity without necessarily knowing anything specific about364
what it might be. Such generality does mean, however, that if evolution is progressive in365
this sense, then the progressive trait might well be some highly complicated characteristic366
of the population that does not necessarily correspond to any biological attribute of an367
organism that is a priori natural. In this way, some readers might prefer to view the368
theorem presented here as a definition of progressive evolution rather than as a statement369
about the limitation of theory. In other words, we might define progressive evolution as an370
evolutionary process for which we could, in principle, construct a negation-complete371
evolutionary theory. The theorem then says that this definition is equivalent to there372
existing some quantity that increases over evolutionary time.373
Decidability results, such as those presented here, are often prone to misinterpretation374
(Franze´n, 2005). Therefore it is important to be clear about what the above theorem says375
as well as what it does not say. First, the theorem does not imply that developing a376
predictive theory of evolution is impossible. A very large portion of current research in377
evolutionary biology is directed towards developing such predictive capacity and therefore378
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the theorem takes the existence of such a theory as a starting point. The rationale is to379
determine whether there might still be other, inherent, limits on the kinds of questions that380
can be answered even if we are successful in pushing the development of current research in381
this direction. The theorem demonstrates that there are such inherent limits, and in382
essence the problem arises from a difficulty in predicting the places that evolution does not383
go. In other words, although a predictive theory can always be used to map out the course384
of evolution, interestingly, it cannot always be used to map out the courses that evolution385
does not take. The theorem presented here, in effect, demonstrates that doing the latter is386
not possible unless evolution is progressive.387
How are these considerations to be interpreted in the context of examples like that of388
influenza evolution discussed earlier? First, as already mentioned in that example, the389
analysis would begin by taking what is essentially a best-case scenario, and supposing that390
we have enough knowledge of the system to develop an open-ended model that perfectly391
predicts (possibly in a probabilistic way) the genetic composition of the influenza392
population in the next time step, as a function of its current composition. Then we ask, is393
there a significant probability that another flu pandemic with the 1918 strain will ever394
occur? The above theorem states that, even if we had such a perfect model, this kind of395
question is unanswerable unless influenza evolution is progressive. In other words, unless396
some characteristic of the influenza population changes directionally during evolution (e.g.,397
some aspect of the antigenicity profile changes directionally) such a prediction will not be398
possible. Moreover, this limitation arises because, even though we can use our perfect399
model to map out the course of influenza evolution over time, this need not be enough to400
map out the parts of genotype space that influenza will not explore.401
The above limitations apply to predictions about the genetic evolution of the population,402
but what if we are interested only in phenotypic predictions? For example, could we403
predict whether or not an influenza pandemic similar in severity to that of 1918 will ever404
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occur again, regardless of which strain(s) cause the pandemic? Likewise, could we predict405
whether or not resistance to antiviral medication will ever evolve, regardless of its genetic406
underpinnings? If the genotype-phenotype map is one-to-one, then predicting phenotypic407
evolution will be no different than predicting genotypic evolution. Even if many different408
genotypes can produce the same phenotype, however, predicting phenotypic evolution still409
involves predicting whether or not certain subsets of genotype space are visited during410
evolution. As a result, all of the aforementioned limitations should still apply to such cases.411
The only exception is if the genotype-phenotype map resulted in the dimension of412
phenotype space being finite even though the dimension of the genotype space was413
effectively infinite. Even in this case, however, the above limitations to prediction would414
still apply unless phenotypic knowledge alone was sufficient to predict the state of the415
population from one time step to the next (i.e., if we didn’t need to consider genetic state416
to understand evolution). While this might be possible for some phenotypes of interest, it417
seems unlikely that it would be possible for all possible phenotypes.418
One might argue, however, that some patterns of phenotypic evolution are very predictable.419
For example, the application of drug pressure to populations seems inevitably to lead to420
the evolution of resistance to the drug. How are these sorts of findings reconciled with the421
results presented here? First, although the evolution of resistance does appear to be422
somewhat predictable, we must distinguish between inductive versus deductive predictions.423
One reason we feel confident about predicting the evolution of drug resistance is that we424
have seen it occur repeatedly. Therefore, by an inductive argument we expect it to occur425
again. Such inductive predictions are conceptually similar to extrapolating predictions426
from a statistical model beyond the range of data available. On the other hand, deductive427
predictions are made by deducing a prediction from an underlying set of principles or428
mechanistic processes. In a sense, inductive predictions require no understanding of the429
phenomenon in question whereas deductive predictions are based on some underlying430
model of how things work. The results presented here apply solely to deductive predictions.431
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A second possibility with respect to the evolution of things like drug resistance, however, is432
that evolution is progressive (at least at this ‘local’ scale). For example, it might well be433
that if we formulated an accurate underlying model for how influenza evolution proceeds in434
the presence of antiviral drug pressure, there would be some population-level quantity that435
changes in a directional way during evolution. Indeed it seems plausible that it is precisely436
this kind of directionality that makes us somewhat confident we can predict evolution in437
such cases. It should be noted, however, that even if evolution if not progressive the438
theorem presented here does not rule out the possibility that some predictions can be439
made. For example, it is entirely possible that a theory could still be developed to make440
negation-complete predictions about the evolution of drug resistance. The theorem simply441
says that it will not be possible to make negation-complete predictions about any arbitrary442
aspect of evolution unless the evolutionary process is progressive.443
As already mentioned, all of the results presented here begin with the assumption that we444
can develop a theory to predict evolution from one time step to the next. Whether or not445
current theoretical approaches can be pushed the point where this is true remains a446
separate, and open, question. There are certainly considerable obstacles to doing so unless447
the evolutionary system of interest is very simple (e.g., Ibarra et al. (2002)). In addition to448
the problem that historical contingencies raise, the role of uncertainty in initial conditions,449
much like those in weather forecasting, might preclude long-term predictions (although450
probabilistic statements might still be possible). This remains an important and active area451
of research on which the theorem presented here offers no perspective. Rather it simply452
reveals that, in the event that theory is eventually developed to do so, it will still face453
inherent limitations on the kinds of questions it can answer unless evolution is progressive.454
Although a negation-complete theory for the entire evolutionary process of interest is not455
possible unless evolution is progressive, this also does not preclude the possibility that a456
perfectly acceptable, negation-complete, theory might be developed for short-term and/or457
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local predictions. Indeed, just as similar inherent limitations in computability theory and458
mathematical logic have not prevented people from making astonishing progress in these459
areas of research, so to is the case for evolutionary biology. As mentioned in the460
introduction, many theoretical advances have already been made by focusing on subsets of461
the space of potential evolutionary outcomes. Continuing to push theoretical development462
in this direction by broadening the space considered will be possible regardless of the463
nature of the evolutionary process. The theorem does imply, however, that unless evolution464
is progressive, it will not be possible to encompass all such developments within a single465
unified set of principles from which all negation-complete evolutionary predictions can be466
drawn.467
There are some previous theoretical results in the literature that consider the extent to468
which evolution exhibits a directional tendency and it is useful to consider how the present469
results relate to these previous works. For example, it has been shown previously with470
quite general stochastic models of evolution that a quantity termed ‘free fitness’ is always471
non-decreasing during evolutionary change (Iwasa, 1988). The analysis, however, did not472
allow for open-ended evolution because the state space was assumed to be finite, and the473
Markov model used was (implicitly) assumed to be positively recurrent. As a result, a474
unique stationary distribution existed and thus continual evolution was precluded.475
It might be reasonably argued however that, although analyses such as (Iwasa, 1988) do476
not allow for truly open-ended evolution, if the state space is large enough, and if the477
transient dynamics are long enough, then it is effectively an open-ended model. As such,478
should not the results with respect to free fitness still apply? In other words, does this not479
then suggest that there is some quantity (free fitness) that increases during evolution, and480
thus that a negation-complete theory is possible? The answer is no, and the reason is481
subtle but important. The definition of free fitness in (Iwasa, 1988), like other quantities482
that have been suggested to change directionally during evolution (e.g., Adami et al.483
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(2000)) are based on measures closely related to entropy. Importantly, the mapping484
between these measures of entropy and population states is not one-to-one because there485
are many (indeed, potentially infinitely many) biologically distinct population states that486
have the same value of entropy (or the same value of ‘free fitness’). As a result, even487
though measures like free fitness might not decrease during evolution, an indefinite amount488
of biologically interesting and significant evolutionary change can still occur without any489
change in free fitness. Roughly speaking, although measures related to things like entropy490
provide an interesting physical quantity that might change directionally, the relationship491
between entropy and quantities that are of biological interest need not be simple.492
In a similar vein one might argue that, because biological evolution takes place within a493
physical system that is subject to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, ultimately a494
general measure entropy must provide a directionality to the system. Again, while this is495
true is terms of the system as a whole, the mapping between entropy and the population496
states of biological interest is not one-to-one. Thus, even though the total entropy of the497
entire physical system must always increase, the entropy of any component part (e.g., the498
biological part of interest) need not change in this way.499
What do all these considerations have to say about how the process of evolution is studied,500
or how current theoretical research is done? Should evolutionary biologists care about such501
results? For instance, do the results point to new ideas that might help us do theory502
better? Although there is no single answer to this question, there are two points worth503
making in this regard. First, the distinction between open and closed-models seems like a504
useful, and currently somewhat under-appreciated, way to categorize models of evolution.505
As such it does suggest some new directions in which evolutionary theory might be taken,506
particularly given that open-ended models are sometimes amenable to asking novel, and507
potentially very important, evolutionary questions that cannot be addressed with closed508
models (e.g., Fontana and Buss (1994); Fontana and Schuster (1998b); Lenski et al. (1999);509
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Stadler et al. (2001); Yedid and Bell (2001); Wilke et al. (2001); Yedid and Bell (2002);510
Lenski et al. (2003); Chow et al. (2004); Ostrowski et al. (2007)). Second, to the extent511
that one cares about developing theory for open-ended evolutionary processes, the theorem512
presented here then reveals that there is an inherent ‘upper bound’ on how far we can push513
the predictive capability of such theory. In particular, although such theory opens the door514
to asking new evolutionary questions, unless evolution is progressive, there will remain515
some such questions that are unanswerable. Furthermore, although it will likely be difficult516
to use the theorem as a means of proving that evolution is progressive (i.e., by developing a517
negation-complete theory) or to use the theorem to prove that a complete evolutionary518
theory is possible (i.e., by determining that evolution is progressive) the result does519
nevertheless reveal that these two important, and somewhat distinct, biological ideas are520
fundamentally one and the same thing.521
My intention was not to imply that the theorem could be used to determine decidability522
from knowledge of progression, or the reverse. Rather, it was to prove (within the set of523
assumptions used) that decidability and progression can be viewed as one of the same524
thing.525
The theorem presented here has close ties to Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem for526
axiomatic theories of the natural numbers (Go¨del, 1931; Nagel and Newman, 1958; Davis,527
1965; van Heijenoort ed., 1967; Smith, 2007). An axiomatic theory consists of a set of528
symbols, a logical apparatus (e.g., the predicate calculus), a set of axioms involving the529
symbols, and a set of rules of deduction through which new statements involving the530
symbols can be derived (termed ‘theorems’; Smith (2007)). Given such a system, theorems531
can be derived through the repeated algorithmic application of the rules of deduction.532
In the early 1900’s there was a concerted attempt to produce such an axiomatic theory533
that was meant to represent the natural numbers, with the proviso that it yield all true534
statements about the natural numbers, and no false ones; (Whitehead and Russell, 1910;535
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Smith, 2007). Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem (Go¨del, 1931; Nagel and Newman, 1958;536
Davis, 1965; van Heijenoort ed., 1967; Smith, 2007), however, revealed that this is537
impossible for any axiomatic system sufficiently rich that it can make simple538
number-theoretic statements. For example, it shows that if the axiomatic system is rich539
enough that it can express the number-thoeretic statement corresponding to the predicate540
‘x ∈ RE ’, then it cannot produce all true number-theoretic statements and no false ones541
(Smith, 2007). For if it could, then it could always produce the number theoretic statement542
corresponding to either ‘x ∈ RE ’ or ‘x /∈ RE ’ as a theorem, because one of the two must be543
true. But if it can do this, then it provides an algorithmic procedure for deciding the544
predicate ‘x ∈ RE ’, and we know that this is not always possible as the results presented545
here illustrate.546
The Halting Problem from computability theory (Turing, 1936; Cutland, 1980) is also547
intimately related to the results presented here. As already detailed, the question of548
whether a population state is evolutionarily attainable is equivalent to the question of549
whether a given positive integer is in the range of a particular computable function.550
Moreover, this latter question is directly connected to the analogous question of whether a551
given integer is in the domain of a computable function (i.e., whether, given a particular552
integer input, the function returns a value in finite time). The latter problem is precisely553
the Halting Problem, and it is known that there is no general algorithmic procedure for554
solving the Halting problem for arbitrary computable functions (Turing, 1936; Cutland,555
1980).556
As mentioned earlier, in a very general sense, the results presented here are applicable to557
any system that can be faithfully described by a Markov dynamical system over an infinite558
set of discrete possibilities (i.e., an open-ended dynamical system). Therefore, one might559
ask whether there is anything in the results presented that is particular to evolution per se?560
In one sense the answer is ‘no’, but therein lies the power of such mathematical abstraction;561
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it reveals the underlying, key, structure of the process. Evolution will be an open-ended562
dynamical system whenever heredity is indefinite, and it therefore shares a fundamental563
similarity with all other processes that are also such open-ended dynamical systems.564
At the same time, however, the results do have special significance for evolution. There are,565
perhaps, relatively few other kinds of processes of interest that share the property of being566
such an open-ended dynamical system in a meaningful way. For example, a great many567
processes of interest have a relatively small space of potential outcomes, and are thus568
clearly not open-ended. Furthermore, for those processes that are potentially open-ended,569
it is sometimes of little theoretical interest to distinguish among all possible outcomes, and570
therefore the space of relevant outcomes can still be relatively small. Moreover, even when571
the space of potential outcomes of interest truly is open-ended, some processes (e.g., some572
physical processes) obey simple enough dynamics that such negation-complete predictions573
can readily be made (i.e., the system is ‘progressive’ is the sense considered here). Thus,574
the limitations detailed by the theorem are of interest, primarily for those processes that575
are both open-ended, and that are complex enough that the question of progression is576
unresolved (Appendix 4). Evolution under indefinite heredity might be a somewhat unique577
process in satisfying both of these criteria.578
There are, however, other processes of interest for which such decidability results might be579
of interest. After all, in an important sense, biological evolution is nothing more than the580
emergent properties of physics and chemistry. In fact such limitations on theory have been581
discussed previously, particularly as they relate to the so-called theory of everything in582
physics (Hawking, 2002). It is probably safe to say that no general concensus on this issue583
has yet been reached (Franze´n, 2005); however, the theorem presented here has584
implications for any physical or chemical theory that aims to explain evolutionary585
phenomena. It demonstrates that a rational, deductive, approach to such theory will586
necessarily face some inherent limitations on the answers that it can provide.587
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Figure 1: A schematic representation of the coding of population states, and the theorem.698
Middle irregular shape represents the space of population states, S, with four states699
depicted (the ovals). Roman numerals indicate the time when each state is visited during700
evolution (silver-shaded state, s = {T, T, T}, is never visited). Vertical ovals on right and701
left represent two different codings by the positive integers, along with their respective702
evolutionary mappings, φE(n) and φEˆ(n), over the first three time steps. If evolution is703
progressive, then Coding 2 is possible, and the theorem then says we can ‘decide’ any704
population state, s ∈ S. For example, we can decide state ‘T,T,T’ by finding its code (i.e.,705
‘1’), and then iterating the map, φEˆ(n), until we obtain an output greater than ‘1’ (this706
occurs at time step 1 because φEˆ(1) = 2). If ‘1’ has not yet been visited by this time, it707
never will be. Conversely, if all population states are decidable, then under Coding 1 we708
can apply the algorithm provided in Part 2 of the theorem’s proof to obtain Coding 2,709
thereby demonstrating that evolution is progressive.710
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Appendices711
1 Theory712
The term ‘theory’ is used in a technical sense. A theory consists of a set of symbols that713
constitute the language of the theory, a set of premises which are taken as given, and a set714
of rules of inference (Smith, 2007). The symbols represent certain components of reality,715
and the premises constitute statements about reality through the interpretation of the716
symbols. The rules of inference then constitute valid ways of deducing new statements717
about the symbols of the language, and thus through interpretation, new statements about718
reality. Thus, within such a theory, statements are derived by taking some premise(s), and719
applying the rules of inference.720
Statements derived through a series of deductive arguments using the rules of inference are721
referred to as theorems of the theory. The result of the main text is valid for any722
evolutionary theory whose theorems are recursively enumerable (Appendix 2); i.e., any723
theory whose theorems can be derived through the use of a finite (but possible large)724
number of mechanical, or algorithmic, steps (e.g., as laid out in the rules of inference;725
Appendix 2). This is clearly true for any such theory based on computation, since726
computers do nothing more than mechanically follow rules (Cutland, 1980). It is also true727
for any axiomatic theory, since the theorems of any such theory can be derived simply by728
applying the mechanical rules of inference to the axioms (Smith, 2007).729
A great deal of current quantitative theory in evolutionary biology fits the above template.730
For example, current theory often abstracts reality mathematically by assigning formal731
symbols to things like allele frequencies and population sizes. A set of premises is then732
taken, for example, by formalizing an hypothesis about how genotypic fitnesses are733
determined. Next, a finite number of applications of ‘rules of inference’ are used (e.g., the734
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application of certain mathematical operations) in order to derive statements about the735
formal symbols of this theory. Finally, these symbolic statements are then interpreted736
again in terms of their biological meaning, and hence predictions about evolution are made737
(Fig. S1).738
Figure S1: A schematic representation of the relationship between the biological process of739
evolution and theory. The example given illustrates classical population-genetic theory. A740
formal system is created to represent elements of evolution (e.g., p(t) represents the number741
of the blue genotype at time t). A set of premises is specified (e.g., initial genotype742
numbers, how genotypic fitnesses are determined, etc. - this is embodied by the mapping743
F ). Rules of deduction are then followed (e.g., repeated application of the mapping F ) to744
obtain new statements about elements of the formal theory (e.g., p(1), p(2), p(3) etc.).745
These new elements are then interpreted in terms of evolution (e.g., as predictions about746
genotype numbers at future times).747
2 Some results from computability theory748
A function is computable if it can be evaluated by an Unlimited Register Machine (URM)749
in a finite numbers of steps (Cutland, 1980). The Church-Turing Thesis states that any750
function we might view as being evaluated through a mechanical procedure can be751
evaluated by a URM (Cutland, 1980). Thus, given the Church-Turing Thesis, the easiest752
way to ascertain whether something is computable is to consider whether a computer could753
be programed to do it in such a way that an output is guaranteed, in a finite (but possibly754
very large) number of steps.755
Definition: A function is total if it is computable over all natural numbers.756
Definition: A function is partial if it is computable only over some (nonempty) subset of757
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the natural numbers.758
Definition: A set is denumerable if there exists a bijection between it and the natural759
numbers.760
Definition: A set is effectively denumerable if this bijection, and its inverse, are761
computable.762
Definition: The characteristic function of a set of natural numbers, A, is763
cA(n) =


1 if n ∈ A
0 if n /∈ A
(1)
Definition: The predicate ‘n ∈ A’ is decidable if its characteristic function is computable.764
Definition: The set A is recursive if the predicate ‘n ∈ A’ is decidable.765
Definition: The partial characteristic function of a set of natural numbers, A, is766
c¯A(n) =


1 if n ∈ A
undefined if n /∈ A
(2)
Definition: The predicate ‘n ∈ A’ is partially decidable if its partial characteristic767
function is computable for n ∈ A.768
Definition: The set A is recursively enumerable (denoted r.e.) if the predicate ‘n ∈ A’ is769
partially decidable.770
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Note that every recursive set is r.e. but not vice versa. Furthermore, a set A is recursive if,771
and only if, both A and its complement Ac are r.e.. Finally, note that any finite set of772
numbers is recursive (Cutland, 1980).773
The following concepts and notation will also prove useful:774
First, because any computable function can be evaluated through a series of steps, we can775
define coA(n) as the value of cA(n) after the o
th step in its evaluation. In particular, coA(n)776
evaluates to ‘null’ if it has not returned a value by the oth step.777
Second, a standard result from computability theory demonstrates that there exists a778
computable bijection between N+ and N+ × N+ (Cutland, 1980). We will denote this779
mapping by B : n 7→ (T1(n), T2(n)).780
Third, the notion of an ‘unbounded search’ is central in computability theory. In781
particular, it is standard to use the notation µy(f(y) = k) to denote ‘the smallest value of782
y such that f(y) = k’.783
Fourth, a fundamental theorem of computability theory demonstrates that the set of all784
computable functions is denumerable (Cutland, 1980). Thus, we can use φk(n) to denote785
the kth computable function, and Rk and Dk as its range and domain respectively. We will786
also make use of the notation Rk(n) = {x : φk(i) = x, i ≤ n}. In other words, if φk(n) is787
evaluated for increasing values of n, then Rk(n) is the subset of the range of φk(n) that has788
been visited by step n. This is clearly computable for any n if φk(n) is total.789
Finally, notice that it was implicitly assumed that the mapping, G corresponding to the790
evolutionary process is computable, and thus E(n) is a computable function. Thus, the791
evolutionary process is, in an important way, nothing other than computation. Although it792
is not practically feasible to verify or refute this assumption for most evolutionary systems,793
there are very good reasons to expect that this assumption is reasonable. First, if we are794
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willing to view the processes occurring in our biological system as being purely795
‘mechanical’, then we can appeal to the Church-Turing Thesis to argue that G must796
thereby be computable. Second, the use of the term ‘evolution’, as a process, should not be797
restricted to a particular instantiation of this process, as for example occurs in798
carbon-based life. For example, there are very good reasons to think that the processes799
occurring in in silico evolution are fundamentally the same as those occurring in biological800
evolution. As such these would clearly be computable. Finally, even if biological evolution801
isn’t formally computable (i.e., it is not mechanical) we nevertheless usually proceed by802
assuming that it can be modeled using computation.803
3 The set of population states is effectively804
denumerable805
Here we prove that the set of possible population states is effectively denumerable; i.e.,806
that there exists a computable bijection between the population states and the positive807
integers with a computable inverse. Such sets are also called effectively denumerable.808
Proof: We simply need to demonstrate an effective procedure (i.e., a computable procedure)809
for both encoding and decoding the population states into positive integers. Let M be the810
maximum possible population size (a positive integer). Each of the M ‘slots’ is either811
vacant, or filled by an individual that is completely characterized by its DNA sequence.812
Furthermore, we can set A=0, C=1, G=2, T=3, and then read the DNA sequence from its813
5’ to 3’ end, thereby establishing a unique characterization of each slot in the population.814
(A) Encoding: For each of the M slots calculate a numeric code as follows: Reading the815
DNA from its 5’ to 3’ end, for the nth base, take the nth prime number and raise it to the816
power corresponding to this base as listed above. Multiply all these numbers together.817
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This gives a unique number for each distinct DNA sequence, and thus the mapping is818
injective. Furthermore, since all positive integers greater than or equal to 2 have a unique819
prime factorization, all such integers correspond to a DNA sequence. Thus, if we code the820
state ‘vacant’ with the number 1, the mapping is surjective as well. Furthermore, this821
procedure is computable for any piece of DNA. This shows that there is a computable822
encoding for each slot, and since the population is simply the union of a finite number of823
such slots, the population state has a computable encoding as well. In particular, the824
coding of each slot locates a point in N+ × · · · × N+ (where N+ appears M times) that can825
be uniquely identified by its indices. One can then cycle through all possible indices as826
follows: start with all indices that sum to 1, then those that sum to 2 etc. This is827
computable, and for each instance we simply assign a code number in increasing order.828
(B) Decoding: For any given code number, cycle through the sets of indices as above,829
stopping once the code number is reached, and determine those indices. Once these indices830
have been obtained, one can determine their corresponding DNA through their prime831
factorization.832
4 Some additional technical information about the833
theorem834
The theorem of the text would be of little interest if it were never possible for ‘x ∈ RE ’ to835
be undecidable. It is well-known in computability theory that there exist computable836
functions for which such predicates are undecidable ((Cutland, 1980); Appendix 4), but the837
evolutionary process considered represents a special kind of computable function. In838
particular, it must satisfy the mapping φk(n+ 1) = G
(
φk(n)
)
for all n, where G() is a839
computable function with appropriate domain. The subset of computable functions840
satisfying this relation will be referred to as Markov, total, computable functions.841
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This section presents a series of three lemmas that, together, demonstrate that there do in842
fact exist Markov computable functions for which ‘x ∈ RE ’ is undecidable (see also843
Cutland (1980); Smith (2007)). In such cases, the set of evolutionarily attainable states,844
RE will be called ‘recursively enumerable’ (r.e.; because ‘x ∈ RE ’ is always at least845
partially decidable for Markov computable functions). On the other hand, if ‘x ∈ RE ’ is846
decidable, then RE is said to be ‘recursive’ (Appendix 2 and Appendix 4).847
Lemma 1: A set of numbers is recursively enumerable if, and only if, it is the range of848
some total, computable, function. Note: we could relax the ‘total’ requirement without much849
change.850
Proof: (i) A r.e.⇒ ‘A is the range of a total computable function’851
Given A is r.e., the partial characteristic function of A is computable; i.e.,852
c¯A(n) =


1 if n ∈ A
undefined if n /∈ A
(3)
is computable. Now first choose an a ∈ A. This is a computable operation since we can853
simply use the bijection B : n 7→ (T1(n), T2(n)) to evaluate c¯
T2(n)
A (T1(n)) for increasing n854
until it returns a value of 1, and then identify the corresponding value T1(n). Next, we can855
define the computable function856
g(x, o) =


x if c¯oA(x) = 1
a otherwise
(4)
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Then, again we can use the computable bijection B : n 7→ (T1(n), T2(n)) to define857
f(n) = g
(
T1(n), T2(n)
)
. This is a total computable function with range equal to A.858
(ii) ‘Rk is the range of a total computable function’ ⇒ Rk r.e.859
Consider the total function φk(n). We can then construct the computable partial860
characteristic function for Rk as follows: For any input value, x, output the value 1 after861
evaluating µi(φk(i) = x).862
Q.E.D.863
Given Lemma 1, we can then prove the following, second, lemma;864
Lemma 2: There exists total computable functions whose ranges are r.e. but not recursive.865
Using Lemma 1, we can prove Lemma 2 by proving that there exist sets that are r.e. but866
whose complements are not r.e.867
Proof Sketch (by construction) see Smith (2007):868
We will demonstrate that K = {n : n ∈ Rn} is one such set. It is clear, therefore, that869
other such sets can be constructed as well.870
First it can be proven that Kc is not r.e. using Cantor’s diagonal argument (e.g., see Smith871
(2007)). In particular, since all r.e. sets are the range of some computable function, and872
since the computable functions are denumerable, the set of all r.e. sets is denumerable. So873
we simply need to construct a set that is not in this list. Choosing numbers n such that874
n /∈ Rn satisfies this property, and this is exactly K
c.875
All that remains then is to show that K is r.e. As with characteristic functions, all876
computable functions are evaluated through a series of operations for each input, and877
therefore we can consider the oth operation of any computable function. Therefore, define878
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g(x, o, n) =


φn(x) if φn(x) halted by operation o in its evaluation
n+ 1 otherwise
(5)
This is a computable function. Now we can use the bijection B : n 7→ (T1(n), T2(n)) to879
define f(z, n) = g
(
T1(z), T2(z), n
)
. This is also computable, and for any given n and z it880
outputs either n+ 1 or else an element of Rn. We can then construct the computable881
partial characteristic function for K as follows: For any input value, n, output the value 1882
after evaluating µz(f(z, n) = n).883
These results show that there exist computable functions whose ranges are r.e. but not884
recursive. Note that some such functions might have the same output values for more than885
one value in their domain, but these cannot be Markov computable functions. The reason886
is simply that the mapping G ensures that, if RE is infinite, then φE(n) can never repeat887
itself as n increases (see Lemma 1, Appendix 5). Therefore, we still need to demonstrates888
that, even if we restrict attention to Markov computable functions, some such functions889
have r.e. ranges that are not recursive. This is done in the third lemma:890
Lemma 3: For every total computable function having a range that is r.e. but not recursive,891
there exists a total computable Markov function with the same range.892
Proof: Suppose that φk(n) is total and has an r.e. range that is not recursive (and thus Rk893
is infinite). Define the computable function φkˆ(n) = φk(z(n)), where894
z(n) = µi(φk(i) /∈ Rk(n− 1)). It is clear that φkˆ(n) is a total, computable function with895
range Rk. Now we simply need to show that φkˆ(n+ 1) = G
(
φkˆ(n)
)
for all n for some896
computable G(). By construction we can see that the computable function897
G(y) = φkˆ(µz(φkˆ(z) = y) + 1) works, where its domain is Rk. This function takes a state y,898
finds the unique time at which this state occurs (i.e., µz(φkˆ(z) = y) - this is computable),899
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and then adds 1. The resulting value is then used in the function φkˆ(n) to compute the900
state in the next time step. In particular, we can see that G
(
φkˆ(n)
)
= φkˆ(n+ 1).901
Q.E.D.902
5 Continuous Time & Stochasticity903
For simplicity of exposition, all results of the main text have assumed that the evolutionary904
process is deterministic and that generations are discrete. Here we show that an analogous905
theorem holds if we relax these restrictions.906
To begin, it is easy to see that the assumption of discrete generations is immaterial. In907
particular, if we take generations to be continuous, then we can suppose that, at any908
instant in time, only a single event is possible (e.g., individual birth or death). Thus,909
because the state space is discrete, we can simply view the continuous-time process as one910
in which discrete events occur at points in time that need not be uniformly spaced.911
Allowing for stochasticity requires more work. If the evolutionary process is deterministic,912
then there is a single population state possible for each point in time, n. In the analysis of913
this case, we supposed that we had complete knowledge, not only of the evolutionary914
mapping, G an its initial condition, but of the solution to this mapping, φE(n) as well (and915
it is a total, computable, function).916
Now there will be uncertainty in what the population state will be at time n, and in fact917
there will potentially be several different states that the population might attain at n.918
Some of these might be more likely than others in that, if we replayed the evolutionary919
process multiple times, certain states might arise more often than others. Thus we might920
imagine a probability distribution over the set of positive integers at each time step, n. By921
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analogy with the deterministic case, we make a Markov assumption, meaning that the922
probability distribution on the population states at any given time, n, depends only on the923
population state in the previous time, n− 1. In other words, there is some mapping, H ,924
from current population state to the probability distribution over the population states in925
the next time period. The solution of this mapping (given an initial condition) then gives926
the probability distribution over the states at each point in time.927
Just as with the deterministic case, we suppose that we have complete knowledge of the928
solution of this evolutionary process in the following sense: at any time n, we have a total,929
computable function that tells us simply the set of states, at that time, that have positive930
support. Thus, we have a total, computable, set-valued function φ˜E(n) that gives the set of931
“feasible” states at time n. The ‘tilde’ signals that this function is now a set-valued932
function, rather than an integer-valued one. And again the goal of a negation-complete933
theory would then be to decide whether any given state lies within the set of feasible states934
or not.935
One objection to this formulation is that we might expect all states have some nonzero936
probability, even if it is vanishingly small. As such, under this definition all states would937
then be trivially feasible. There are at least two potential responses to this objection.938
First, while it is true that many models of evolution assume that all states have nonzero939
probability (e.g., many stochastic models of mutation-selection balance, including those940
with an infinite number of different alleles; Kimura and Crow (1964)), this is usually941
because they are ‘closed’ models in the sense described earlier. In particular they often942
assume, for mathematical convenience, that the stochastic process is irreducible and943
positively recurrent. This then implies that a unique stationary distribution exists944
(Grimmett and Stirzaker, 1992) and thereby rules out the possibility of open-ended945
evolution. Although it is possible to develop a model for open-ended evolution that still946
has nonzero probability for all states, it is not obvious that this need be true of real947
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open-ended evolution. For example, out of the effectively infinite number of different948
nucleotide combinations that could make up a genotype, we might expect at least some of949
these to be truly lethal. On a more practical level, given the analysis presented here it950
seems reasonable to expect that a similar theorem could be proved if we instead defined a951
state as being feasible if it occured with some probability greater than a small threshold952
value, ǫ > 0. At this point, however, such a theorem remains conjecture.953
Given that all of our considerations with respect to computability have been restricted to954
integer-valued functions, we now need to make the notion of computability of φ˜E(n) more955
precise. The set-valued function φ˜E(n) can be thought of as consisting of two separate956
computable functions, each of which is an integer-valued function and so fits within the957
notions of computability already discussed. The first function is simply a computable958
function φE(i) as before, whose range is now thought of as the set of feasible population959
states. The argument i here is now no longer meant to be evolutionary time, however, but960
rather is simply an index whose meaning is described below. The second computable961
function we denote by φE∗(n), and it specifies the number of feasible population states in962
generation n in the following way: the set of all feasible population states at time 1; i.e.,963
φ˜E(1) is given by {φE(1), φE(2), ..., φE(k1)}, where φE∗(1) = k1. Likewise,964
φ˜E(2) = {φE(k1 + 1), ..., φE(k1 + k2)}, where φE∗(2) = k2, and so on. In this way, we can965
apply the same notions of computability to the set-valued function φ˜E(n) by applying them966
to its component, integer-valued, functions φE(i) and φE∗(n). We will assume that the set967
φ˜E(n) is finite for all n, which guarantees that it be computable. Nevertheless, it seems968
reasonable to expect that some formulations in which this set is infinite would still be969
computable, and thus would still fit within the results that follow.970
As in the deterministic case, we must also specify the initial conditions, in addition to the971
mapping, H . Then, in terms of the mapping, H , if x ∈ φ˜E(n) is a feasible population state972
at time n, the set of feasible population states at time n+ 1 is given by973
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φ˜E(n + 1) =
⋃
x∈φ˜E(n)
supportH(x), where supportH(x) denotes the set of states for which974
H(x) has positive support. The range of φ˜E(n) is the set of all states that are feasible at975
some time (i.e., it is the range of φE(i)). Likewise, a state is evolutionarily attainable if976
there is some time for which it is feasible. A complete evolutionary theory is one for which977
the predicate ‘x ∈ RE ’ is decidable; i.e., if, given any population state, we can decide978
whether it is feasible at some time.979
The same definition of progressive evolution can be used in both the deterministic and980
stochastic cases. To specify this precisely, we need the following Lemmas;981
Lemma 1: In the deterministic case, a new state is visited every time step if, and only if,982
evolution is unbounded (i.e., RE is infinite)983
Lemma 2: In the stochastic case, at least one new state is feasible every time step if, and984
only if, evolution is unbounded (i.e., RE is infinite)985
Proof is given of Lemma 2 only (Lemma 1 can be proven in an analogous fashion). We986
note that, in the remainder of this section, we use the notation RE(n) to denote the set of987
population states that have been visited (i.e., feasible) by step n of the set-valued function,988
φ˜E(n) (i.e., not step n of φE(n)). Equivalently, it denotes the range of φE(i) visited by step989
i = k1 + k2 + · · ·+ kn.990
Proof:991
‘At least one new state is feasible each time step’ ⇒ ‘Evolution unbounded’992
This direction of the implication is obvious since, if at least one new state is feasible each993
time step, then the fact that φ˜E(n) is total implies that RE is infinite.994
‘Evolution unbounded’ ⇒ ‘At least one new state is feasible each time step’995
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Contrary to the assertion, suppose instead that RE is infinite but that there is some time,996
n∗ at which no new state is feasible. In other words, for some time n∗, the set φ˜E(n
∗)997
satisfies φ˜E(n
∗) ⊆ RE(n
∗ − 1). The set of feasible states in the next time step is then given998
by φ˜E(n
∗ + 1) =
⋃
x∈φ˜E(n∗)
supportH(x). Furthermore, for each element, x ∈ φ˜E(n
∗),999
∃nx < n
∗ such that x ∈ φ˜E(nx) (from the hypothesis that φ˜E(n
∗) ⊆ RE(n
∗ − 1)).1000
Therefore, for each element, x ∈ φ˜E(n
∗), we have that supportH(x) ⊆ φ˜E(nx + 1), where1001
nx < n
∗. Thus, we have1002
φ˜E(n
∗ + 1) =
⋃
x∈φ˜E(n∗)
supportH(x) (6)
⊆
⋃
x∈φ˜E(n∗)
φ˜E(nx + 1) (7)
⊆ RE(n
∗ − 1). (8)
Hence, by induction, RE ≡ RE(n
∗ − 1), which is finite, yielding a contradiction.1003
Q.E.D.1004
Notice that, in the deterministic case, when evolution is unbounded the computable1005
function φE(i) never repeats a previously attained value as i increases (Lemma 1 above).1006
In the stochastic case, however, even when evolution is unbounded, φE(i) can repeat1007
previously attained values as i increases. The key connection between the two cases is that,1008
in the stochastic case, φE∗(n) is such that, when the outputs of φE(i) are grouped into1009
their corresponding evolutionary generations, each such grouping always contains at least 11010
new feasible state (Lemma 2 above).1011
Now, returning to the proof of the theorem, in the deterministic case, Lemma 1 shows that1012
a new population state is visited at every time step. And if evolution is progressive, then1013
44
there is some way to recode the populations states such that, the code number of these new1014
states that are visited over time increases. Likewise, Lemma 2 shows that at least one new1015
population state becomes feasible at every time step, although some visited population1016
states might have been visited previously as well. Nevertheless, we still say that evolution1017
is progressive if there is some way to recode the populations states such that, the code1018
number(s) of the new states that become feasible each time step, increases with time.1019
Formally, if we define σEˆ(n) = REˆ(n) \REˆ(n− 1) as the set of newly feasible states in1020
generation n, and min σEˆ(n) as the smallest of these, then evolution is progressive if there1021
exists a computable bijection, Cˆ, between the positive integers and the population states,1022
such that min σEˆ(n+ 1) > min σEˆ(n) for all n. Since the set REˆ(n) is finite and1023
computable for all n, min σEˆ(n) is a total computable function.1024
The proof of the theorem then goes through as follows:1025
Theorem: x ∈ RE’ is decidable (i.e., RE is recursive) if, and only if, there exists a1026
computable one-to-one coding of the population states by positive integers, Cˆ, such that, for1027
the corresponding description of the evolutionary process, φ˜Eˆ(n),1028
min σEˆ(n + 1) > min σEˆ(n) for all n.1029
Proof:1030
Part 1: ∃Cˆ s.t. min σEˆ(n + 1) > min σEˆ(n) ∀n ⇒ RE recursive1031
By hypothesis there exists a computable bijection Cˆ such that min σEˆ(n+ 1) > min σEˆ(n)1032
for all n. Now for any population state, x, in the original coding, let xˆ be the corresponding1033
code under bijection Cˆ. Define z(xˆ) = µi(min σEˆ(i) ≥ xˆ). Clearly ‘xˆ ∈ REˆ(z(xˆ))’ is1034
decidable since REˆ(z(xˆ)) is finite and enumerable. Furthermore xˆ ∈ REˆ(z(xˆ))⇔ xˆ ∈ REˆ1035
owing to the progressive nature of evolution. Therefore, ‘xˆ ∈ REˆ ’ is decidable as well.1036
Finally, using S denote the set of population states that are evolutionarily attainable, we1037
have that xˆ ∈ REˆ ⇔ Cˆ
−1xˆ ∈ S ⇔ CCˆ−1xˆ ∈ RE . Noting that, by definition, x = CCˆ
−1xˆ,1038
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we obtain xˆ ∈ REˆ ⇔ x ∈ RE . Thus, ‘x ∈ RE ’ is decidable as well.1039
Part 2: RE recursive ⇒ ∃Cˆ s.t. min σEˆ(n+ 1) > min σEˆ(n) ∀n1040
We can construct the required computable bijection to show that evolution is progressive1041
as follows.1042
Since RE is recursive, we know that ‘x ∈ RE ’ is decidable. So take the population states, x,1043
in order and go down the list using the following algorithm:1044
(i) if x /∈ RE and it is the k
th such state up to that point, return the kth odd number.1045
(ii) if x ∈ RE , and if it has not yet been assigned a new code number, do the following:1046
• calculate µi(x ∈ φ˜E(i)) (i.e., the first time that x becomes feasible).1047
• calculate σE(i), the entire set of newly feasible states at i.1048
• using the notation |A| to denote the cardinality of A, assign codes to all of the |σE(i)|1049
elements in σE(i), by starting with the |RE(i− 1)|+ 1 even number, up to the |RE(i)|1050
even number, in any order.1051
• move on to the next state in the list.1052
Thus, REˆ is again the set of even numbers, and the new states that are feasible each time1053
step always have larger code values as time increases. In particular, using CˆC−1 to denote1054
the algorithm described above in points (i) and (ii), where C−1 is the inverse mapping of1055
the coding that generated x (i.e., it takes code x and returns the corresponding population1056
state, s), we have min σEˆ(n + 1) = min CˆC
−1σE(n+ 1) = 2|RE(n) + 1|. The last equality1057
follows from the fact that CˆC−1σE(n+ 1) determines the first time that each element of1058
σE(n+ 1) occurs (which is n+ 1 for all such elements by definition), and then assigns the1059
codes 2|RE(n) + 1| up to 2|RE(n + 1)| for these elements. The minimum of these codes is,1060
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of course, 2|RE(n) + 1| giving min σEˆ(n + 1) = 2|RE(n) + 1|. As a result,1061
min σEˆ(n + 1) > min σEˆ(n) because |RE(n)| is strictly increasing with n (from Lemma 2).1062
Q.E.D.1063
6 Effectively Infinite Systems1064
The simplified system of evolution considered in the main text assumes that the space of1065
potential population states is infinite, and focuses on unbounded evolution (i.e., |RE| =∞).1066
One might argue, however, that any real system of evolution is necessarily finite, if only1067
because of a potential limit to the constituent elements of the genetic material. There are1068
two potential responses to this objection. First, on a philosophical level, although any1069
particular evolutionary system might be finite, one might nevertheless want evolutionary1070
theory to stand abstractly, independent of any particular instantiation of an evolutionary1071
dynamic. This is very much analogous to the fact that, in the context of number theory,1072
although one necessarily only ever has to deal with a finite number of things that require1073
counting, we nevertheless desire an abstract theory of numbers that does not presuppose1074
any finite limitations. And just as such a negation-complete theory of numbers is not1075
possible (Go¨del, 1931; Nagel and Newman, 1958; Davis, 1965; van Heijenoort ed., 1967;1076
Smith, 2007), neither is one for evolutionary biology unless evolution is progressive.1077
Second, on a more practical level, it is clear that the digital nature of heredity offered by1078
DNA/RNA makes such systems effectively infinite in that the number of possible1079
population states is enormous. The remainder of this section makes the notation of1080
effectively infinite precise. For simplicity, the focus below is on the deterministic system.1081
Recall that, in the |RE | =∞ case, a function is computable (and total) if it can be1082
evaluated in a finite number of steps, for any input (Cutland, 1980) (Appendix 2). Thus1083
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the predicate ‘x ∈ RE ’ is decidable if its characteristic function can be evaluated, for any1084
input value x, in a finite number of steps. Likewise, the mapping Cˆ of the theorem is1085
computable if, for any input, it returns a code number in a finite number of steps.1086
When |RE | <∞, however, the predicate ‘x ∈ RE ’ is always decidable because we can1087
always carry out a complete cataloguing of RE in a finite number of steps. We simply need1088
to successively evaluate φE(n) for increasing values of n. According to Lemma 1 of1089
Appendix 5, because RE is finite, we will eventually obtain a value that has previously1090
been visited, and from that point onward the system will then simply revisit previously1091
visited states.1092
Although these observations are formally correct, they nevertheless fail to capture the1093
important consequences of digital inheritance in finite systems. In particular, the natural1094
analogue of computability for such finite systems in the context of indefinite heredity is not1095
the requirement that an output be obtained in a finite number of steps. Rather, it is that1096
an output be obtained in a finite number of steps, and that this number of steps not exceed1097
some finite bound that is independent of the size of the state space, |RE|. For example, with1098
this definition for finite state spaces, the predicate ‘x ∈ RE ’ would be decidable if its1099
characteristic function can be evaluated in a finite number of steps, and if this number1100
never exceeds some finite bound that is independent of |RE|. Thus, regardless of the size of1101
|RE |, we are guaranteed to never need more than a fixed number of computational steps.1102
To formalize these ideas, we need to be precise about what it means to consider state1103
spaces of different sizes, |RE |. We do this as follows. First, consider the infinite state space1104
situation used in the main text, where φE(n) denotes the computable function1105
corresponding to the evolutionary process. Next, define the finite state space process by a1106
computable function, F ηE(n), where n = η + 1 is the first time at which a previously visited1107
population state is re-visited, and where F ηE(n) = φE(n) for all n ≤ η. Note that we have1108
η = |RE|, and thus η is the state space size. In this way, any given finite state space1109
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process is identical to the reference infinite state space process, φE(n), over time until the1110
point η + 1 at which the finite process begins to revisit previously visited states. Thus we1111
can consider state spaces of different sizes, η, with the limiting case of η →∞1112
corresponding to the infinite state space of the main text. We have the following revised1113
definitions for the finite case:1114
Definition: The predicate ‘x ∈ RE ’ is *decidable if, for any input x, there exists a T <∞1115
such that the characteristic function cRE(x) can be evaluated in no more than T steps,1116
where T is independent of η (i.e., independent of system size).1117
Definition: A one-to-one mapping of the population states by the positive integers, Cˆ, is1118
*computable if, for any input there exists a T <∞ such that the mapping can be1119
evaluated in no more than T steps, where T is independent of η.1120
The main theorem of the text can again be seen to hold when |RE | <∞ if we use the1121
above definitions. In particular,1122
Theorem: ‘x ∈ RE’ is *decidable if, and only if, there exists an *computable one-to-one1123
coding of the population states by a subset of the positive integers, Cˆ, such that the1124
corresponding description of the evolutionary process, F η
Eˆ
(n), satisfies F η
Eˆ
(n+ 1) > F η
Eˆ
(n)1125
for all n ≤ η.1126
Notice that there is one difference from the main theorem of the text; namely, the altered1127
characterization of progressive evolution. Now, because RE is finite, we say that evolution1128
is progressive if there is some quantity that increases over time before the process begins to1129
repeat. Also note that, in addition to the altered definition of ‘computable’ and ‘decidable’1130
in the statement of the theorem, all other instances of computability use this altered1131
definition as well.1132
Only a sketch of a formal proof is given for this modified theorem because it is similar that1133
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of the main text. Recall that F ηE(n) denotes the computable function corresponding to the1134
finite evolutionary system of interest.1135
Proof (Sketch):1136
Part 1: ∃ *Cˆ s.t. F η
Eˆ
(n+ 1) > F η
Eˆ
(n) ∀n ≤ η ⇒ ‘x ∈ RE’ *decidable1137
As before, take any input x and find its new code, xˆ. By hypothesis the number of steps1138
required is bounded by a constant that is independent of system size. Next, we can begin1139
to successively evaluate F ηE(n) for increasing values of n. We suppose that the number of1140
steps required in this computation for any n ≤ η is independent of η. This is a reasonable1141
assumption because the outputs are identical to those of φE(n) when n ≤ η, and the1142
number of steps required to evaluate φE(n) is independent of η for any n. To each output1143
of F ηE(n) we can apply the above mapping, Cˆ to obtain F
η
Eˆ
(n), which by hypothesis,1144
increases with n ≤ η. By hypothesis the number of steps required is independent of η for1145
each such application.1146
As we proceed, either we reach (i) n = η prior to reaching an n for which xˆ < F η
Eˆ
(n), or we1147
reach (ii) a value of n whereby xˆ < F η
Eˆ
(n) before n = η. In either case ‘x ∈ REˆ ’ is then1148
decidable because, if xˆ has not been reached by this point, it never will be. Thus, ‘x ∈ RE ’1149
is decidable as well. Moreover, if (i) pertains, then the number of steps required before1150
deciding is no more than µi(φEˆ(i) ≥ xˆ), If (ii) pertains, then this number of steps is exactly1151
equal to µi(φEˆ(i) ≥ xˆ). And because µi(φEˆ(i) ≥ xˆ) is finite and independent of η, we can1152
see that ‘x ∈ RE ’ is *decidable as well.1153
Part 2: ‘x ∈ RE ’ *decidable ⇒ ∃ *Cˆ s.t. F
η
Eˆ
(n+ 1) > F η
Eˆ
(n) ∀n ≤ η1154
We can construct the required *computable bijection between population states and an1155
appropriate coding as follows. First, take any effective coding of population states. By1156
hypothesis, the number of steps required to decide ‘x ∈ RE ’ for any x is finite and1157
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independent of η. Thus, we can proceed through the population states, x, in increasing1158
order, applying the following algorithm:1159
(i) if x /∈ RE and it is the k
th such state up to that point, use the kth odd number as its1160
new code.1161
(ii) if x ∈ RE , calculate µi(F
η
E(i) = x), and use the i
th even number as its new code.1162
As we proceed though the states, x, the number of steps required for each, regardless of1163
whether (i) and (ii) pertains, is independent of η. Therefore, the entire coding procedure1164
for any given state is independent of η as well; i.e., the coding is *computable as required.1165
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